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tions: consequentialism, which evaluates actions based
on their outcomes, and deontology, which evaluates
actions themselves. These strikingly resemble two dis-
tinct decision-making architectures: a model-based sys-
tem that selects actions based on inferences about their
consequences; and a model-free system that selects
actions based on their reinforcement history. Here, I
consider how these systems, along with a Pavlovian
system that responds reflexively to rewards and punish-
ments, can illuminate puzzles in moral psychology.Consequentialist and deontological ethics
Is it morally permissible to kill one person to save five
others? Moral dilemmas like this engender conflicts be-
tween two major traditions in normative ethics. Conse-
quentialism judges the acceptability of actions based on
their outcomes, and therefore supports killing one to save
five; ceteris paribus, five lives are better than one. By
contrast, deontology judges the acceptability of actions
according to a set of rules; certain actions (e.g., killing)
are absolutely wrong, regardless of the consequences.
Recent work has shown that experimental manipula-
tions can sway people’s judgments toward either conse-
quentialism or deontology, suggesting that these
perspectives have distinct neural underpinnings [1]. One
influential account of these findings posits that deontologi-
cal judgments stem from automatic emotional processes,
whereas consequentialist judgments result from controlled
cognitive processes [1]. Others argue that this dual-process
approach is computationally insufficient and cannot ex-
plain how hypothetical scenarios are transformed into
mental representations of actions and outcomes [2]. Uni-
versal moral grammar offers a computational theory of
problem transformation, but lacks a neurobiologically
plausible, mechanistic description of how values are
assigned to mental representations of actions and out-
comes, and how those values are integrated to produce a
final consequentialist or deontological judgment.
Model-based and model-free valuation
Recent advances in neuroscience offer a fresh perspective.
Evaluations of actions and outcomes are guided by distinct
decision-making systems that are psychologically and
neurally dissociable [3–6]. The model-based system gener-
ates a forward-looking decision tree representing the con-
tingencies between actions and outcomes, and the values of§ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Com-
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the tree and determining which action sequences are likely
to produce the best outcomes. Model-based tree search
is computationally expensive, however, and can become
intractable when decision trees are elaborately branched.
The computationally simple model-free system does not
rely on a forwardmodel. Instead, it evaluates actions based
on their previously learned values in specific contexts
(states): good state-action pairs are those that have pro-
duced desirable outcomes in the past (e.g., push door),
whereas bad state-action pairs are those that have pro-
duced undesirable outcomes in the past (e.g., push person).
Because the model-free system lacks access to current
action–outcome links, it is retrospective rather than pro-
spective and can make suboptimal recommendations in
settings where traditionally good actions lead to undesir-
able outcomes, or vice versa [3,6].
A third, Pavlovian system promotes automatic reflexive
approach and withdrawal responses to appetitive and
aversive stimuli, respectively [6]. Pavlovian biases can
influence behaviors guided by model-based and model-free
evaluations: for example, in aversive Pavlovian-to-instru-
mental transfer, aversive predictions can suppress instru-
mental actions [4]. Pavlovian biases can also influence
model-based evaluations themselves: searching a decision
tree can be conceptualized as a set of internal actions that
can be suppressed by aversive predictions [6]. This
amounts to a ‘pruning’ of the decision tree, whereby mod-
el-based tree search is curtailed when an aversive outcome
is encountered [7].
There is now substantial evidence that model-based,
model-free, and Pavlovian systems are situated in at least
partly distinct brain circuits, although behavioral outputs
likely reflect their combined influence [3,5], and recent
evidence suggests that certain regions integrate model-
based and model-free evaluations [8]. These systems often
arrive at similar conclusions about the best action to take,
but they sometimes disagree. Understanding how such
conflicts are resolved is an active topic of research [6].
Models of morality
On the surface, consequentialism and deontology appear to
map directly onto model-based and model-free systems,
respectively. Consequentialist andmodel-basedapproaches
both evaluate actions based on their outcomes, whereas
deontological and model-free approaches both evaluate
the actions themselves. However, a deeper analysis reveals
that deontological judgments likely arise from sophisticated
interactions between systems.
Consider one puzzle. In the classic trolley dilemma, a
trolley is hurtling out of control down the tracks toward five
workers, who will die if you do nothing. You and a large363
Box 1. Explaining aversion to physical harms
Previous work attributes deontological judgments to automatic
emotional processes [1]. Here, I distinguish between retrospectively
rational (but re-trainable) model-free mechanisms and ecologically
rational fixed Pavlovian mechanisms, both of which sway judgments
toward deontology in cases in which harm involves physical contact.
The model-free system evaluates contextualized actions on the basis
of their reinforcement history. Young children learn through experience
that actions that physically harm others (e.g., hitting, pushing) result in
aversive outcomes (e.g., punishments, distress cues [9,10]). Simulta-
neously, parents and society verbally instruct children that physical
harm is forbidden, warning about the consequences of transgressions.
Both experience and instruction enable themodel-free system to attach
negative value to harmful physical actions toward people, as in a class
of algorithms (called Dyna) that complement experiential trial-and-error
learning with hypothetical trial-and-error learning [6]. Importantly,
the latter method, whereby model-free values can be retrained by
model-based simulations, provides a route via which characteristically
deontological judgments could be adaptive to changes in the environ-
ment that are detected by model-based mechanisms.
By contrast, the Pavlovian system triggers responses to predictions
of valenced stimuli; whereas the values of stimuli can be learned,
Pavlovian proclivities to approach (avoid) appetitive (aversive) stimuli
are fixed, like reflexes. For aversive predictions, one type of Pavlovian
response is behavioral suppression; this response is ecologically
rational in the sense that refraining from action is generally a good
strategy when some actions might produce aversive outcomes [4].
Aversive predictions embedded within moral dilemmas could evoke
Pavlovian processes that disfavor active responses, leading to
characteristically deontological judgments. Harmful actions that
involve physical contact may generate particularly strong aversive
predictions (e.g., fearful expressions, screams, gore).
Computational approaches to decision-making account for choices
by adding up model-based, model-free, and Pavlovian action values,
and then converting those values into action probabilities using a
softmax function [4,6,7], essentially treating the three systems as
separate experts, each of which ‘votes’ for its preferred action.
Differences in state-action reinforcement histories (which influence
model-free values) and aversive predictions (which influence Pavlo-
vian values) could result in more ‘votes’ for inaction in the push
scenario (Figure ID) than in the trapdoor scenario (Figure IC), leading
to a higher proportion of deontological judgments in the former than
in the latter.
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Figure I. (A,B) Example trolley scenarios and typical judgment patterns (data adapted from [2]). (C,D) Diagrams mapping links between states, actions, and outcomes,
and tables depicting the preferred actions of the model-based (MB), model-free (MF), and Pavlovian (Pav) systems.
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variant of this dilemma (trapdoor), you can flip a switch
that will release a trapdoor, dropping the large man onto
the tracks, where his bodywill stop the trolley. Is it morally
permissible to flip the switch, killing the one man but
saving the five workers? In another variant (push), you
can push the large man off the footbridge onto the tracks,364where again his body will stop the trolley. Is it morally
permissible to push theman, killing him but saving the five
workers? Intriguingly, when ordinary people confront
these dilemmas, they are much less likely to endorse
harming one to save five in cases in which harm involves
physical contact with the victim (like pushing) than in
cases in which harm does not involve physical contact (like
Box 2. Explaining the means/side-effect distinction
Building and searching through a decision tree can be conceptualized
as a set of internal actions that may be susceptible to Pavlovian biases
[6]. One example is the suppression of trains of thought that lead to
aversive states, or a pruning of the decision tree [7]. Such pruning is
Pavlovian in that it is reflexively evoked by aversive states and
persists even when counterproductive, preventing the pursuit of
rewards lurking behind aversive states [7].
A critical difference between means and side-effect cases is the
position of harm within the decision tree, which has consequences
for action evaluation in the face of pruning. Consider that model-
based action evaluation integrates the outcomes from all branches
of the decision tree, and Pavlovian pruning of branches containing
aversive outcomes results in a reduced weighting of all the outcomes
in a pruned branch. In side-effect cases, pruning results in a higher
value of ‘flip switch’ by reducing the weight of the aversive
outcome of killing one (compare the left and right panels in Figure IC).
The side-effect death is incidental to saving the five individuals, so it
can be safely pruned away while preserving the contribution of
saving five toward the overall action value. This sort of selective
amnesia for negative side effects is not possible in means cases,
however. Here, because the aversive outcome of killing one is
required to obtain the positive outcome of saving five, pruning away
the aversive outcome necessarily also prunes away the positive
outcome. Thus, in means cases, although pruning reduces the
weight of the negative outcome of killing one (just as in side-effect
cases), it also reduces the weight of the positive outcome of saving
five (compare the left and right panels in Figure ID). The divergence
in judgments between means and side-effect cases may be
explained by the possibility that in the face of pruning, the positive
outcome of saving five contributes less strongly to the overall action
value in means cases (in which it is pruned away) compared to side-
effect cases (in which it is not).
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Figure I. (A,B) Example trolley scenarios and typical judgment patterns (data adapted from [2]). (C,D) Decision trees representing actions and outcomes. Pruning occurs
at the first aversive outcome encountered. The overall value for flipping the switch (Vflip) is computed by adding the values from all tree branches: the positive value of
saving five individuals (V(5 lives)) and the negative value of killing one (V(1 death)).
Forum Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 2013, Vol. 17, No. 8releasing a trapdoor) [1,2], even though these cases have
identical outcomes.
Understanding how different decision systems evaluate
actions and outcomes can illuminate puzzles such as the
push–trapdoor divergence (Box 1). Consistent with univer-
sal moral grammar accounts [2], I propose that the model-
based system transforms hypothetical scenarios into a
structural description of actions and outcomes (i.e., a deci-
sion tree). By searching the tree, the model-based system
evaluates all possible outcomes and recommends the
action that leads to the best outcome.
Simultaneously, the model-free system evaluates
contextualized actions, assigning negative values to
state-action pairs with negative reinforcement histories(e.g., push person [9,10]). An important question is how
the model-free system could evaluate actions that have
never been performed directly (e.g., violent acts). One
possibility is that action values are learned via observa-
tion: a recent study showed that observational model-free
learning engages similar neural structures as does experi-
ential model-free learning [11]. Alternatively, the model-
based system could train the model-free system through
off-line simulations [6].
Finally, the Pavlovian system may respond to model-
based predictions of aversive outcomes (derived from
the scenario text and represented in the decision tree)
or, alternatively, to the model-free aversive values
assigned to the described actions [4,6]. Each system365
Forum Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 2013, Vol. 17, No. 8‘votes’ for its preferred action, and choices are a product
of their combined influence. We can explain the differ-
ence in judgments for the push and trapdoor cases by
considering that pushing a person and flipping a switch
differ in terms of both their reinforcement histories and
their proximal expected outcomes, which in turn influ-
ence the ‘votes’ of the model-free and Pavlovian systems
(Box 1).
Consider a second feature of moral judgment: people
readily distinguish between harm performed as a means to
a desired end, and harm occurring as a foreseen side effect
(Box 2). This distinction can be seen by contrasting the
trapdoor case (described above) with the following side-
track case: again, a trolley is hurtling out of control down
the tracks toward five workers, who will die if you do
nothing. You can flip a switch that will divert the trolley
onto a different set of tracks, where a large man is stand-
ing. Is it morally permissible to flip the switch, killing the
large man but saving the five workers? Despite the fact
that outcomes are matched in these cases, people judge
flipping the switch in the trapdoor case to be worse than in
the side-track case. Why?
In the trapdoor case, the large man is used as a means:
his body is instrumental in stopping the trolley, preventing
it from hitting the five workers. In the side-track case, the
death of the large man is a foreseen side-effect of the action
performed to save the five workers. The structure of the
decision tree is critical here; the means/side-effect distinc-
tion may arise from Pavlovian pruning of model-based tree
search (Box 2) [7].
Because the neurobiology of model-based, model-free,
and Pavlovian systems is reasonably well delineated, the
current framework offers a parsimonious explanation of
previous findings. For example, the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) seems to play a role in integrating mod-
el-free and model-based evaluations [3,5]. The proposal
that model-free evaluations contribute to deontological
judgments, together with the possibility that the mPFC
incorporates model-free values into moral judgments, can
account for two robust findings in the literature: that
physical contact cases such as push, commonly associated
with deontological judgments, activate the mPFC [1]; and
that patients withmPFC lesions show a reduced tendency
toward deontological judgments in those same cases [12].
Pavlovian aversive predictions have been linked to sero-
tonin function [4,7]; if such predictions play a key role in
deontological judgments, enhancing serotonin function
should increase deontological judgments, which has in-
deed been demonstrated [13]. Finally, there is evidence
that stress shifts control from model-based to model-free
systems [14]. My account suggests that stress should
similarly promote deontological judgments, as recently
reported [15].366Concluding remarks
One benefit of multiple decision systems is that each
provides advantages in certain situations. Model-based
control is optimal for simple decisions. However, when
the decision tree is too extensive and tree search becomes
computationally intractable, model-free and Pavlovian
mechanisms provide useful heuristics. Perhaps multiple
ethical systems exist for similar reasons. Consequentialism
provides a flexible framework for maximizing good and
minimizing evil, but in the face of uncertain or ambiguous
outcomes that are commonly encountered in real-world
moral dilemmas, deontological rules help to keep us out
of trouble. Whether normative models of decision-making
can informnormative ethics remains a tantalizing question.
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